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After Leader itself, Shadow Chancellor can be said to be the most coveted position on the opposition front bench (deputy leader is a party role which usually comes with a distinct shadow portfolio).  It is an important strategic job upon which an opposition party’s economic and social policy hinges and to a large degree economic credibility rests. Following the 2010 general election, former Education Secretary and failed leadership contender Ed Balls almost publically campaigned for the role, rapidly taking it from former Home Secretary Alan Johnson. As recognition of stature, Conservative leader William Hague appointed Michael Portillo to the post upon returning to the Commons in 2000.  Persuaded to stand aside from the Labour leadership in favour of Tony Blair in 1994, ‘the deal’ struck by Gordon Brown in part revolved around retaining the Shadow Chancellorship and with it enhanced powers over the domestic policy agenda. And those Shadow Chancellors who successfully transition into government - including Geoffrey Howe, Gordon Brown and George Osborne - will have laid the foundations for electoral victory by shaping policy and the strategic direction of their party alongside the opposition leader. 

The Shadow Chancellor is but one member of the opposition front bench but can be said to be distinctive in two main ways and, therefore, worthy of attention. These are the centrality to a party's perceived economic competence and the strategic influence over other policy portfolios within the Shadow Cabinet. Perceived economic competence is fundamental to a party's electoral prospects and to a large extent this responsibility rests with the Shadow Chancellor.  Secondly, along with leader itself, Shadow Chancellor is the only permanent Shadow Cabinet position to boast strategic policy power, influencing and controlling other front bench portfolios.  While such powers vary (as they do in office), domestic (spending) policy can be seen, in part, to be a subset of economic policy.

Academics have tended to ignore opposition in favour of the actions of government but there are a limited number of excellent studies amongst the literature (Johnson, 1997; Collings & Seldon, 2001; Norton, 2008). There is also some exploration of opposition leader particularly in specific cases (Denver, 1987; Kinnock, 1994; Stuart, 2006; Cowley, 2009, Heppell, 2012; Heffernan, 2014). But while the policy contributions of certain figures such as Geoffrey Howe, Gordon Brown or George Osborne are given attention (Wickham-Jones, 2003; Dorey, 2004; Wade, 2013), there is scant research which examines the strategic role of Shadow Chancellor and how it complements the British Parliamentary system. As with leaders, it is recognised that there are limitations in establishing generalisations given the differing characteristics of post holders and as such this paper’s approach is to burrow into some key contrasts to form a coherent view of the Shadow Chancellor’s place in British politics.  

Believing that the role of Shadow Chancellor should be critically reviewed, this article is organised around four key questions which are judged sufficiently embracing to take a comparative and longitudinal perspective of the role: 

1)	Who has been Shadow Chancellor and have they been putative leaders in a similar way that the Chancellor is sometimes viewed as putative Prime Minister?
2)	What is the power relationship with opposition leader?
3)	How does leadership of the Treasury team further the understanding of the Westminster system?
4)	How does parliamentary and media profile account for the Shadow Chancellor’s prestige?

It concludes by reflecting on a fifth: What is the purpose of the Shadow Chancellor? As such the article’s distinctive contribution is to offer a comprehensive analysis of the Shadow Chancellor within the British Westminster system in order to get some sense of its value.  It makes the argument that this coveted role is central to mainstream conceptions of parliamentary opposition and both closely associated with the leadership and inseparable from it.  However, while the strategic influence might derive from the control over the party’s domestic policy platform and numerous shadow colleagues’ portfolios, the article demonstrates that the foundation of its esteem is performing a central coordinating role second only to leader and with a profile located outside Westminster as a media figurehead representing an alternative government. 

Connecting contemporary understanding with some historical analysis, the article examines various snapshots of data going back to the Shadow Chancellor in post at the 1959 general election (the election at which the ‘shadow cabinet’ was formally established) to address these key questions. There are dangers in making direct comparisons with politics today with those of fifty years ago.  Globalisation, social media, 24 hours news have changed politics and have changed the role of Shadow Chancellor the holder of which today has to be someone adept at media relations.  As such it was judged prudent to give greater weight to more recent and established practices while retaining the historical overview. While the broad approach is to embed this generated data within the mainstream body of knowledge, some textual exploration is also offered by way of an interview with former Shadow Chancellor, Michael Howard.  While this represents little more than corroboration, he is a useful witness having also been leader of the opposition. 

The analysis offered here is far from exhaustive and so there is also some sense of an invitation to other scholars to build upon and challenge this initial attempt to look more deeply into the nature of leading the opposition Treasury team.  This might include exploring further the impact of economic experience prior to taking the role, the influence of special advisers or international comparisons. 


Who has been Shadow Chancellor and have they been putative leaders?

Heffernan (2003,366) argues that with the exception of Anthony Barber, Norman Lamont and possibly Nigel Lawson, ‘all Chancellors of the Exchequer since 1962 have been putative prime ministers, an alternative to the incumbent should he or she falter’. This can be said of Chancellors before 1962 but for the purposes of this article, the question is whether the same is true of Shadow Chancellors relative to the opposition leader. This furthers the understanding of the relationship between post holders and the party leadership but more broadly where they came from and where they went having held it. 

For those with personal ambition, it is worth analysing just how valuable the post of Shadow Chancellor is as a route to power. Table 1 offers some collated data for the 20 Shadow Chancellors going back to immediately before the 1959 general election. It shows when they held office, indicates whether they ever contested their party leadership and the highest office they went on to achieve. 

It can be said categorically that 15 of the cohort (75%) had at some point entertained leadership ambitions having put themselves forward as a candidate.  The shadow chancellorship, in this respect, could be seen as either a stepping stone or a consolation prize. From the figures generated, it can be seen that every one of Labour’s Shadow Chancellors since 1955 has at some point been a candidate for the party leadership with the sole exception of Alan Johnson, the former Home Secretary who was both talked about as a potential leader and who ran for deputy leader after the 2010 general election.  

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

For the Conservatives, the figures are less stark and yet of the 10 Shadow Chancellors to have served on the front bench during the period, six have at some point contested the leadership. This includes the victor of the Conservative’s first ever leadership election, Edward Heath, in 1965. However, of the 20 Shadow Chancellors just six subsequently led their party; the same number as actually held the post of Chancellor.  Four of the leaders became Prime Minister with John Smith and Michael Howard distinct as the only former Shadow Chancellors who became leader not to reach Number Ten. 

Notable too is that six of the list subsequently failed to hold either a more senior post in the Shadow Cabinet or any post in government while two, in the form of Francis Maude and Oliver Letwin, were subsequently appointed to government jobs but ones that can be seen to be considerably more junior than Chancellor. Neither of these were leadership contenders.  However, every one of the Shadow Chancellors as at the six respective general elections which saw a change in governing party, were appointed to the Exchequer (Callaghan, Macleod, Healey, Howe, Brown, Osborne). This is important because it connects a party’s electoral success directly to the ‘alternative chancellor’ as will be explored in a subsequent section. 

It is useful to compare the post of Shadow Chancellor with that of the other senior role on the front bench which is seen as one of natural opposition to the government. Table 2 offers similar data relating to the post of Shadow Home Secretary dating back to those in post immediately before the 1959 general election.  Again it details the dates they held office, whether they ever contested the leadership and the highest office achieved subsequently

Of the 24 holders of this job, just eight (33%) have been candidates for their party’s leadership (two of whom were also Shadow Chancellor). And only one, Tony Blair, became leader and Prime Minister. While only three actually went on to be appointed Home Secretary (Whitelaw was appointed to the Home Office in 1979), five subsequently failed to hold either a more senior post in the Shadow Cabinet or any post in government.  A number later held Cabinet positions which are arguably less senior than Home Secretary but (former Shadow Chancellor) Oliver Letwin is alone in being appointed to government subsequently though as a more junior Minister of State. 

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 

For completeness and to consider Shadow Chancellors and leaders from both sides, Table 3 offers data on the previous posts of all Conservative and Labour leaders during the period. It details the post each held prior to becoming leader and whether it was in government or in the Shadow Cabinet.  While Miliband and Hague were elected in opposition, they simply carried their portfolio from government following election defeat and did not operate substantially in the role. That is, the shadow role could not have defined them in the view of those electing them to the leadership. Consequently their Cabinet jobs are listed as their last post.  Foot likewise went from Leader of the House to shadow his old job but operated in that position for 18 months after the 1979 election.  Similarly Gaitskell held on to the portfolio also becoming Labour Party Treasurer in opposition in the emerging ‘shadow cabinet’ system. 

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

What can be said of the remainder is that there is very little by way of a pattern.  Of the 11 leaders who held shadow portfolios before becoming leader, four were Shadow Chancellor with a fifth, Harold Wilson, having held the job prior to moving portfolios. While this could be viewed as a low proportion given the high number of Shadow Chancellors who contested the position at some point, what is notable is that this is the only recurring shadow post to figure in the leadership since 1955 other than Education held by Kinnock and Cameron respectively. The last Shadow Chancellor to have become leader, Michael Howard, offered both former Conservative leader William Hague and future leader David Cameron the post but both turned it down, the latter lobbying for this ‘public service portfolio’ (Watt, 2005). 

Given the emerging literature on the experience of political leaders (Barber, 2014; Cairney, 2007, Cowley, 2012) Table 1 also includes a column which details the primary pre-parliamentary career of each Shadow Chancellor.  While these figures will have amassed other experience before Westminster and during their time as an elected politician, very few of the principal careers held by these figures can be said to be in any way preparation for the job of Shadow Chancellor (or Chancellor). This is an area where there could be further research. 

It can be argued, therefore, that there is a tendency for Shadow Chancellors to be appointed from among the most ambitious opposition politicians, though not necessarily from those boasting professional ‘expertise’ in the portfolio. This lends credence to the idea that from an individual standpoint, they can often be seen as putative leaders because they are usually credible alternatives.

What is the power relationship with Opposition leader?

Shadow Chancellors’ powers are not only those formally exercised but also relate to the structure of opposition politics.  To this end relative power is linked to a Shadow Chancellor’s security in the post and this is dependent on the relationship with the person who appoints them: the opposition leader. For electoral success, these two figures need to act with some degree of unison, not only in public but also with parliamentary colleagues. More united and disciplined opposition parties are more likely to win elections and it can be argued that one requirement to achieve this is fiscal policy control, ultimately placed in the hands of the figure presented to the electorate as a potential Chancellor.  This dual exercised power is described by Howard (2013): ‘Typically a Shadow Chancellor will seek to impose some degree of fiscal discipline on other members of the shadow cabinet… The Shadow Chancellor, the leader, or both will deliver an injunction in shadow cabinet.  Then if another member of the shadow cabinet strays, it’s up to the leader or the Shadow Chancellor to bring them back into line.’ 

Why they hold the post and the power relationship between Shadow Chancellor and Leader can, therefore, be understood by exploring just how secure is the holder of the portfolio.  This section explores incumbency to this end. By examining the raw numbers, it can be seen that, as with many other political jobs, holders have been in post for different lengths of time with Alan Johnson's three months representing the shortest time spent shadowing the Chancellor and Harold Wilson's five years and 10 months being the longest.  

Taking the analysis up to the demise of Ed Balls at the 2015 general election, the average time spent holding the portfolio is approximately two years and nine months.  However, for the six Shadow Chancellors who became Chancellor, the average time in post was three years 11 months.  Here it can be seen that only Callaghan and Healey were not Shadow Chancellor for all or the substantial part of the preceding Parliament.  Callaghan took over from Wilson who later became leader upon Gaitskell's death while Healey replaced the former Chancellor Roy Jenkins part way through a relatively short 1970 Parliament.  By contrast, Osborne, Brown, Howe and Macleod spent four to five years in post prior to an election victory.  

The numbers are very different for the ten Shadow Chancellors who did not subsequently become Chancellor or party leader where the average time spent in post was just 23 months.  Given the less desirable destination of some of these figures, it is evident that the relative power and security of Shadow Chancellors can differ considerably.  

To finish the observation five of the list (all Labour) held the job for the substantial part of previous Parliament but, owing to election loss, did not become Chancellor: Wilson, Shore, Hattersley, Smith and Balls. Wilson and Smith became party leader while Hattersley was already deputy leader. Unfortunate Peter Shore was subsequently Shadow Leader of the House and then failed to be elected to the Shadow Cabinet in 1985. Balls became the first Shadow Chancellor to lose his seat at a general election. 

Here then is something of a correlation between party success, security of the Shadow Chancellor and the power of the post holder as measured by incumbency length. Between elections Shadow Chancellors can be seen to be relatively secure and this can be evidenced by analysing their likelihood of being reshuffled.  Including the formation of shadow cabinets under a new leader of the opposition, there have been at least 29 reshuffles between 1980 and 2013. Taking the three decades is useful since it encompasses two lengthy periods of opposition for the two parties while it is judged that it is long enough to offer longitudinal evidence but sufficiently contemporary to exclude potentially outdated practices from a different political and media age. Minor unplanned changes to the front bench line-up have been excluded here unless there is a wider significance such as the departure of Johnson in 2011.  Post-election defeat changes pending a leadership election have also been excluded except that put in place by Michael Howard in 2005 as this again can be viewed as significant given that it strategically promoted Osborne to the Shadow Chancellorship and Cameron to the Education brief by way of furthering their potential candidatures for the leadership .  

By looking at these changes, it can be seen that of the 29 reshuffles, 12 saw a change in Shadow Chancellor suggesting a crude 41% chance of being moved.  However, when one excludes the eight shadow cabinet formations upon the election of a new leader, just five of the 21 remaining reshuffles resulted in a change of Shadow Chancellor.  This, of course, means that new leaders are usually predisposed to appoint new Shadow Chancellors and on only two occasions during the period (Blair in 1994 and Cameron in 2005) did an incoming leader retain the Shadow Chancellor bequeathed by his predecessor.  This is noteworthy given the personal relationships between Blair / Brown and Cameron / Osborne before the respective leadership bids. 

It can be argued that, irrespective of their personal relationship, the fortunes of leaders and their Shadow Chancellors are intertwined.  Leaders need effective Shadow Chancellors which explains why they are drawn from the parties’ most ambitious politicians. While warning against looking for presidential politics amongst shadows, Howard (2013) explains  this arrangement as ‘part of the importance of establishing a reputation for economic competence, you want as leader of the opposition to be seen to have a consistent approach to economic policy and if you started shifting about your Shadow Chancellor, questions would no doubt be raised about whether this is a change of policy, does it mean that the previous Shadow Chancellor was following a policy the leader didn’t support? And so on.  Those are all questions you prefer not to have asked.’  The consequence of this is that (if not quite co-leadership) the Shadow Chancellor occupies a central coordinating role on the opposition benches that extends beyond the basic functions of the office. 

Occasionally the Shadow Chancellor can be potentially more influential, including those times where they succeed to the leadership.  On both such occasions during the period after 1980 (Smith in 1992 and Howard in 2003) the Shadow Chancellor can be viewed as more credible than their leader (Kinnock and Ian Duncan Smith respectively).  Duncan Smith conducted three reshuffles (2002a, 2002b, 2003) during his relatively short leadership in attempts to shore his faltering position but Shadow Chancellor Michael Howard remained in place as a credible figure for a party trying to project itself as an alternative government.  Only William Hague systematically reshuffled his Shadow Chancellors replacing Peter Lilley in 1998 with Francis Maude and then with Michael Portillo in 2000 as the Conservatives struggled to gain traction against the Blair government (Collings and Seldon, 2001).  The relationship with ‘alternative leader’ Portillo was fraught and undermined Hague’s authority. 

The observation that the Shadow Chancellor has this central coordinating role and is intertwined with leader raises questions about Britain’s oppositional Westminster model. 

How does leadership of the Treasury team further the understanding of the Westminster system?

While there has been meagre academic attention paid to the post of Shadow Chancellor, there are a few seminal studies on the nature of opposition in the British, Westminster, system (Dahl, 1966; Barker, 1971; Punnett, 1973; Brazier, 1989; Johnson, 1997; Norton, 2008, Jordan and Cairney, 2013). To understand the role of Shadow Chancellor in heading the Treasury team, developing policy and exercising strategic power alongside the leader, it is useful to rehearse these established observations which go largely unchallenged today to take a fresh look at the ‘Westminster model’. In doing so this section also considers what Shadow Chancellors do with their power. 

A feature of the confrontational nature of the British House of Commons, the opposition has an institutionalised role in providing an alternative government.  The ‘Westminster Model’ in this sense functions around adversarial politics (Bevir, 2008). The leader of the opposition is a formalised position, recognised in statute by way of the Ministers of the Crown Act (1937), the Ministerial Salaries Consolidation Act (1965) and the Ministerial and Other Salaries Act (1975, as amended). The Ministers of the Crown Act is the first legal recognition of the prime minister and Cabinet and such is significant that it also acknowledged the role of the opposition leader. Under this and the 1975 Act, the leader of the opposition​[1]​ is entitled to a salary as does the opposition chief whip and deputy chief whip whose functions can be viewed at their most basic as the perpetual attempt to defeat government in the division lobbies.  

There is no such recognition for either the Shadow Chancellor or the remainder of the Shadow Cabinet whose job it is to mark and oppose the actions of government ministers.  And yet the Shadow Chancellor and front bench colleagues are a fundamental part of the established political system.  The Shadow Cabinet as is known today emerged in the twentieth century with its origins in the Conservative party’s ‘Leader’s Consultative Committee’ and Labour’s elected ‘Parliamentary Committee’ respectively. Clement Attlee’s organisation after the 1955 general election where he created a 55 strong official opposition can be seen as the formalisation of this. Congruently, so-called ‘Short money’ introduced in 1975 is allocated to opposition parties specifically to ‘fulfil their parliamentary functions’ and (since 1999) to the office of Leader of the Opposition but not to members sitting on the government benches who do not hold office.  This includes Liberal Democrats after 2010 when the party formed a coalition with the Conservatives (Kelly, 2010). Consequently, while specifically allocated to help the opposition hold government to account, Short Money (alongside the Policy Development Grant) could still be viewed partly as supporting the concept of an alternative government who accordingly need to maintain a ‘broad church’ approach beyond niche interests in order to remain sensitive to public opinion (Johnson, 1997) and manifest as parties which are for the most part unified (Norton, 2008). The shadow cabinet itself accepts collective responsibility.  

Such ‘institutionalised’ and official opposition organised by way of a leader and Shadow Cabinet (indeed, shadow government) can be characterised as both adversarial and presenting the electorate with the prospect of an alternative government thus leading to an alternation of (usually majority) parties in office. British opposition emerged from and remains constitutionally embedded within Parliament itself. As such, it is reactive to the government of the day rather than authoritative in its own right. As a result it can usually be described as office seeking rather than policy pursuing (Budge and Keman, 1990) and much of the responsibility falls to the Shadow Chancellor. As Howard (2013) puts it, ‘there are two things the Shadow Chancellor has to do.  One hold the government to account - scrutinise, criticise where appropriate - and two, help to formulate the alternative economic policy which his or her party will be putting forward to the electorate at the next election.’

Furthermore, in replicating the core executive and the debate about prime ministerial power, the existence of the Shadow Chancellor (a putative leader) and Shadow Cabinet in relation to the leader underpin the often overlooked ‘collegiality’ of the Westminster system (Heffernan, 2003) and the reality that, just like the prime minister, the leader of the opposition does not enjoy independence from the legislature as a president or presidential candidate might (Foley, 2000, 2008).  The Shadow Chancellor is, therefore, an alternative chancellor and this responsibility is replicated in heading the opposition Treasury team and interacting with shadow cabinet colleagues. It is perhaps for this reason that every Shadow Chancellor in post at an election victory has been appointed to the Exchequer. 

Heffernan (2014) suggests that party leaders are ‘pre-eminent’ because they lead the shadow government; have the right of electoral strategy and policy proposal and veto; head a powerful private office; control the party’s official news media.  Of these, the right of veto (if not always proposal) is shared with the Shadow Chancellor who also heads a smaller (rival) private office, leading the opposition Treasury team.  However, Heffernan goes on to identify four power sources that can mean a leader is ‘pre-dominant’: leadership reputation; association with political success; electoral popularity; and high parliamentary standing.  This is a view broadly supported elsewhere in the literature with Heppell (2012, 249) for instance critiquing the importance of ‘leadership visibility’. Taking the analysis presented throughout this paper, these traits can also be applied to powerful Shadow Chancellors meaning perhaps that they can be ‘dominant’ within the Shadow Government. One such figure was Geoffrey Howe who played a powerful strategic role in forging economic policy. ‘The Right Approach to the Economy’ (1977), for instance, brought in ‘wet’ James Prior to the approach favoured by the ‘New Right’ of Keith Joseph and Howe himself as well as Margaret Thatcher. But he also represented a ‘hawk’ within the shadow cabinet on industrial relations reform, something about which colleagues were sensitive given the experiences in the Heath government 1970-74 and where Thatcher ‘had to moderate her tone publicly’ (Wade, 2013, 90). 

There are limits to their power in opposition because of the nature of Parliamentary politics and it is for this reason that the Shadow Chancellor's influence amongst his own colleagues can be seen as more of a policy vetoer than as a policy instigator. That is the Shadow Chancellor can stop colleagues from pursuing policies but finds it harder to propose plans outside the Treasury brief.   Such a position was even acknowledged by a ‘very, very angry’ Gordon Brown when in 1995 he complained he was, ‘fed up being portrayed as the cautious conservative one getting in the way of the great radicals’ (Campbell, 2007, 41). Despite this, Brown must be acknowledged as a Shadow Chancellor with unparalleled power; despite protestations, he was an exceptional case given the dominance over domestic policy acquiesced by Blair.

There are further limits on the Shadow Chancellor’s control. Consider the dilemma for an opposition in revealing (popular) policies ahead of a general election.  On the one hand as the political classic authored by Shepsle (1972) suggests, ambiguity is an electoral turn-off with voters, who prefer commitment and credibility.  On the other, viable policies proposed by the opposition can simply be lifted by government and implemented.  A modest example: announcing a reduction of 40,000 civil servants along with other public service efficiencies during his 2004 Budget, Chancellor Gordon Brown implemented a central tract of the Conservative opposition's Treasury policy a year before the general election. 

With a Shadow Chancellor also constrained by the future state of public finances, there are incentives to be cautious about spending commitments while retaining tight control of the timetable which announces plans. Consequently, while strategic, the power of the Shadow Chancellor over colleague's portfolios can be seen to be substantially a negative one and in this respect perhaps contrasts with that pre-eminence of the party leader.  

It can be observed that the functions of the Shadow Chancellor are those of combative opposition to the policies of the government of the day rather than seeking to influence the policy agenda and the role within the front bench team to determine taxation and spending commitments (and as a consequence strategically controlling the scope of the party’s domestic policy).  Heading the opposition Treasury team gives the Shadow Chancellor privileged powers over colleagues and successful holders of the post can be somewhat ‘dominant’ in a similar way to leaders. This distinct position supports both traditional conceptions of opposition in the Westminster model and places limitations upon the notion of ‘presidentialism’ in British politics.  It does not, however, fully encompass the nature of Shadow Chancellor power and influence.  

How does parliamentary and media profile account for the Shadow Chancellor’s prestige?

The source of the Shadow Chancellor’s prestige can be better understood from its profile inside and outside Westminster. Parties have different mechanisms for appointing their front benches out of office with Labour historically employing a parliamentary ballot system electing MPs to the Shadow Cabinet, a practice discontinued by Ed Miliband in 2011 after a vote of MPs. For the Conservatives, control had long rested with the party leader.  Both parties elect their leader, though electoral systems and colleges have changed over time and before 1965, Tory leaders simply ‘emerged’ (Bale, 2009; Denham, 2009; Heppell, 2010). Nonetheless, appointments to particular portfolios, including Shadow Chancellor, remain in the gift of the leader of the day. Such a gift usually goes unquestioned. For example, popular with parliamentary colleagues, Robin Cook topped the poll in the 1994 elections to the Labour Shadow Cabinet but was denied his favoured position marking the Chancellor; a job which went to Gordon Brown who came third (Wickham-Jones, 2000, 106). Nonetheless, as the previous section demonstrates, once appointed (and whatever their rivalries) the electoral fortunes of Leader and Shadow Chancellor are usually intertwined. 

It is instructive to consider the profile of the Shadow Chancellor inside Parliament and out to understand the attractiveness and power of the post. Since the role has been shown to be constitutionally imbedded in Parliament, the chamber is an appropriate place to start.  

When it comes to the big set piece macroeconomic policy event, the Budget, delivered to the Commons each year by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it is not his shadow who replies but rather the leader of the opposition: a sign that the Budget predates the Parliamentary organisation of shadow ministers. The Shadow Chancellor is given a go the next day (and with the benefit of having seen the contents of the Gladstone box).  Nonetheless, there is the reply to the annual spending review, Finance Bill debates and there are also regular Question Time clashes with the Treasury team which can be considered more politically charged than many other senior portfolios such as foreign affairs or defence.  While different shadow positions take on varying degrees of importance according to priorities or vulnerabilities of government or the contextual setting, the Treasury and economic brief is, to a large degree, consistently central since it determines what can be funded and projects credibility (or otherwise) in economic policy and management. 

Developments in Parliamentary protocol have put more control in the hands of non-government actors including the opposition over recent years.  One of the firmly established mechanisms is the provision of Oppositions Days.  Here it is possible to draw on data to see where the Shadow Chancellor sits in parliamentary opposition.  Opposition days were first introduced in 1985 (growing out of Supply Days) and allow the opposition front bench the opportunity to have some control over the agenda and to place a motion for debate before the House of Commons.  Twenty days are allocated to the Opposition in each session with seventeen taken by the largest opposition party.  These days might be taken up with either one or two motions. They are useful because they display at least the tactical priorities of a parliamentary opposition.  

Introduced part way through the long period of Labour opposition in the 1980s, it does mean that data are available for the entire period of Conservative opposition 1997-2010 and there is a record of parliamentary activity in this respect from election loss to regaining office over a period of 13 years.  Table 4 provides details of the number of opposition day debates in each of the 13 sessions from 1997-98 to 2009-10 together with the number of these motions moved by the Shadow Chancellor of the day. 

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

From the statistics generated, it can be seen that of the 331 Conservative Opposition Day motions brought before the House of Commons between 1997 and 2010, just 15 were moved by the Shadow Chancellor, representing just 4.5% of debates chosen by the opposition.  Furthermore, if one discounts the unusually high five of 29 motions during the 1997-98 session (when Hague was trialing his first two Shadow Chancellors), the trend is a derisory 10 opposition day debates of 302 moved by the Shadow Chancellor of the day, representing just 3.3% between 1998 and 2010. 

A comparison can be made with the two respective periods of Labour opposition before 1997 and after 2010.  Here the figures for the first three years of Ed Milband’s opposition leadership 2010-2013 show that just two of the 48 debates during the 2010-12 session were moved by the Shadow Chancellor, selecting ‘the economy’ and ‘jobs and growth’ while none of the 33 debates 2012-13 were led by Ed Balls (to April 2013). In total this represents just 2.5% of opposition day debates.   Even more revealing is the slightly more than three years prior to the 1997 general election when under Tony Blair the opposition became New Labour.  Here it can be seen that not a single one of the 85 opposition day debates during the four sessions 1994-1997 were moved by powerful Shadow Chancellor Gordon Brown.  

This is something which sets the Shadow Chancellor apart from front bench colleagues. Like leader, the Shadow Chancellor’s parliamentary profile is identified with major set piece interventions rather than these generated debates.

Some other conclusions can be drawn here connected to the nature of the brief.  Recognising that governing parties can be expected to prosper electorally when the economy is buoyant (Van der Brug et al, 2007), oppositions have little motivation to highlight economic success in Parliament. But there is also little motivation, where the economy is faltering, for calling a debate which will end in a vote essentially reaffirming confidence in a government’s economic management. Mainstream economic policy debate in recent decades can rarely be described as a matter of principle in the way that perhaps portfolios such as home affairs might just still be and the levers of policy making remain limited (Barber, 2011). As such the political position of the Chancellor and his shadow are ones largely commanding confidence (or otherwise) as judged by the electorate, industry, financial markets or Parliament itself. While votes of confidence are great political theatre, in Westminster’s usually majority system, it is rare for a government to lose such a vote (the last being 1979). Votes lost over major flanks of a government’s policy are usually followed up with a confidence vote which the government invariably wins. However important, where the issue is of economic management rather than one of traditional principle, defeating a majority government is near impossible meaning that oppositions selecting the economy for debate might simply orchestrate a demonstration of Parliament’s confidence in government.  

By way of connecting the themes in this article, also demonstrated by the analysis of Opposition Days is a qualitative judgment surrounding the nature of the debates.  Each of the motions put before the House of Commons can be viewed in the combative tradition; at times exaggerating differences with the government, and supporting the concept of institutionalised opposition rather than being seen as a party seeking to influence policy.

While it is difficult to defeat a government in the Commons especially on economic management (the last time being VAT on fuel in 1992 and required a rebellion from the government benches) economic policy remains crucial.  This means that the a considerable amount of focus for a Shadow Chancellor is outside Parliament and, consequently, this can be seen as a source of the role’s prestige.  

The relationship between electoral fortunes and the state of the economy is long established but the picture is more complex than is sometimes portrayed with both asymmetrical data being processed by the electorate and perceptions of economic competence varying according to party loyalty.  Furthermore, while voters are able judge incumbent competences by assessing the state of the economy, projecting the potential abilities of an opposition involves a more subjective evaluation.  The analysis of Butt (2006) is informative here.  Viewing voters' opinions over three general elections 1992-2001 it is shown that the process by which the electorate evaluates parties' economic competence, in and out of office, is in some ways comparable but in the absence of a record in government, heuristic cues relating to the image of the opposition party and its leadership become more important.  As with the party leader, the image of the Shadow Chancellor can be decisive here in a way which can rarely be said to apply to other opposition front bench positions. 

Taking Ed Balls as its core and using established methodology (Langer, 2010), Fig 1 offers a snapshot of appearances in The Times newspaper for five politicians aggregated monthly over a 32 month period. This approach has value in quantifying the ‘pre-eminence’ of the Shadow Chancellor in comparison to other posts by this measure of media appearances.  After all, it is through the media that most politicians will come to the attention of voters. 

Running from May 2009 through to January 2012, the period begins a year before the 2010 general election and ends a year into Ball’s shadow chancellorship.  This relatively short period has the advantage of taking in three Shadow Chancellors in two parties: Osborne (who became Chancellor in May 2010), former Home Secretary Alan Johnson who held the post for three months before being succeeded by Balls in January 2011.  For comparison, Ed Miliband is included as a Cabinet Minister who became opposition leader in late September 2010 and, since the Shadow Home Secretary comparator is made elsewhere, Yvette Cooper who as well as serving in Gordon Brown’s Cabinet, succeeded her husband Balls in the opposition Home Affairs brief.  It was judged prudent to overlook the other obvious figure, David Cameron, who stepped into Number 10 in 2010 having been opposition leader, since his coverage upon becoming prime minister dwarfs others and makes the central data harder to compare.  There are other limitations to this approach.  While The Times can be seen as a bell weather publication, it is nonetheless only one view of total media in the UK.  It measures quantity of appearances rather than the substance of the news story or indeed its prominence.  Relevance too can be an issue.  For example much of the coverage in May 2011 around Balls related to the Sharon Shoesmith court case dating back to his time as Secretary of State for Education.  In that same month, Ed Miliband was married and this accounts for many of the stories. These qualifications notwithstanding, while somewhat crude, the method allows for some comparative analysis of respective media profiles. 

FIG 1 ABOUT HERE

Some general observations can be made.  Firstly, as a politician Ed Balls has a propensity to newsworthiness vying for prominence as Education Secretary with Home Secretary Johnson in government and enjoying significant and consistently more mentions than cabinet colleagues Cooper and Miliband.  His profile before the election was also usually higher than then Shadow Chancellor Osborne whose appearances became more numerous as Election Day approached further evidencing the electoral significance of the role.  Upon becoming Chancellor in May 2010, however, Osborne’s profile rocketed, reaching a peak of 321 mentions in October 2010 compared to his shadow’s (Johnson) mere 70 in the same month.  Upon becoming opposition leader, Miliband’s profile also rose considerably and usually remained higher than his Shadow Chancellor but lower than the Chancellor of the Exchequer.  While Balls as Shadow Home Secretary enjoyed a higher profile than his successor (Cooper) could claim in that role, it can be said that the job of Shadow Chancellor enhanced his media profile and this is evidenced in two ways.  Firstly the number of mentions in The Times rose sharply when he assumed the portfolio in January 2011 and remained high thereafter, occasionally challenging that of Miliband.  Secondly, when Johnson became Shadow Chancellor in early October 2010, his profile was generally higher than when he was previously Home Secretary and he overtook and maintained a lead over Balls’ media profile (then Shadow Home Secretary) for those three months.  

This analysis adds weight to the proposition that the Shadow Chancellor holds a central coordinating role on the opposition front bench, second only to the leader.  It also to demonstrate a central function of the Shadow Chancellor as being the projection of credibility as an alternative Chancellor to the electorate. The high media profile affords prestige and influence beyond Westminster for ambitious politicians and is underlined by set piece parliamentary interventions rather than generated Opposition Day debates.  

Conclusion: reflecting on the purpose of the Shadow Chancellor

During periods of opposition, even former Cabinet Ministers covert the role of Shadow Chancellor despite the fact that it comes with little by way of ‘trappings’ and has little influence over government policy. Nevertheless, the Shadow Chancellor has a great deal of control over their party’s priorities and spending commitments and this means seniority over colleagues; especially those with spending briefs. 

Michael Howard who has shadowed both the Treasury and the Foreign Office describes the seniority: ‘the Shadow Chancellor has more influence on the policy of the opposition as a whole given the Shadow Chancellor’s ultimate responsibility for finance and drawing up an alternative economic policy .... And that isn’t as important as in government, obviously, but insofar as opposition is important at all, that’s important… Foreign policy is normally much more consensual. It’s an interesting job, you have the opportunity to travel, but it’s not as influential within the shadow cabinet as Shadow Chancellor’. (Howard, 2013).

The article has shown that Shadow Chancellors have this strategic role within opposition and that the associated power is largely negative; that of a policy vetoer rather than instigator and for that matter one of combative critic of government rather than influencer of policy. But the purpose can be said to be deeper than that making the Shadow Chancellor much more distinctive when compared to other front bench portfolios.  Drawing on Heffernan’s (2014) descriptors of leaders, Shadow Chancellors can be somewhat ‘pre-eminent’ and also ‘dominant’ within the shadow government.  The post represents something of a central coordinating role in the shadow cabinet; second only to leader of the opposition.  And like leaders, Shadow Chancellors engage in set-piece parliamentary interventions and enjoy a higher media profile than other opposition figures.  The increase in demands of the media on modern politics over many years has likely intensified this, changing and strengthening the role.  Consequently much of the prestige which accompanies the post is substantially drawn from outside the Commons.

The need to project economic credibility and represent an alternative government is key to understanding its purpose. The Shadow Chancellor has a fundamental role to play in the Westminster system. By reexamining this oppositional model it is shown how the Shadow Chancellor’s grounding underlines parliamentary collegiality and undermines presidentialism.   Most Shadow Chancellors have ambitions to lead their party and usually represent something of a putative leader in a similar way that Chancellors are often putative prime ministers. As a result, this is a role embedded in our understanding of parliamentary opposition. 

It is for these reasons that the fortunes of leaders and their Shadow Chancellors are so closely intertwined, why new leaders tend to appoint new Shadow Chancellors, why they can usually remain secure in their position, exercising power, during the Parliament and why those post holders can expect to be appointed to the Exchequer should the election be won.  

















Table 4 Opposition Day Debates 1997-2010	
			
Session	Total Conservative Opposition Day Debates	Moved by Shadow Chancellor	Details
			
1997-98	29	5	Pensions









2002-03	31	2	Economy and Public Services
			Government Targets
2003-04	33	0	
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^1	  The leader of the opposition is the leader of the largest party in the Commons not to be in government. The Act provides for the Speaker of the House to select who this person is in the event of dispute.  There has been no cause yet for the Speaker to exercise this power.
